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Julius H. Grey* and Jurisdiction, Fairness
Lynne-Marie Casgrain** and Reasonableness
I. Introduction
Jurisdiction has long been a central concept of administrative law. The
traditional view was that judicial review would be granted where there
was jurisdictional error and not otherwise.' However, jurisdiction was
given a broad meaning and, in judicial matters was held to include
violations of natural justice. In Anisminic v. EC.C.2 Lord Reid said at
213.
It has sometimes been said that it is only where a tribunal acts withoutjurisdiction that its decision is, a nullity. But in such cases the word
"jurisdiction" has been used in a very wide sense, and I have come to the
conclusion that it is better not to use the term except in the narrow and
original sense of the tribunal being entitled to enter on the enquiry in
question. But there are many cases where, although the tribunal hadjurisdiction to enter on the enquiry, it has done or failed to do something
in the course of the enquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is
a nullity.
Fairness is a relatively new concept dating from the 1960's3 and, in
Canada the 1970's.4 Its main effect was to destroy the outmoded and
dangerous theory that procedural requirement of justice existed only in
matters definable as quasi-judicial within the meaning of R. v. Electricity
Commissioners5 as interpreted in the period 1930-19656 and in Canada
until 1979 or so. 7
*Faculty of Law, McGill University; Bar of Quebec and Manitoba.
**Bar of Quebec.
1. Save for error of law on the face of the record if there is not a privative clause. See R. v.
Northumberland- exp. Shaw, (1951] 1 K.B. 711, [1951] 1 All E.R. 268. See also Jones & de
Villars, Principles of Administrative Law (Carswell, 1985).
2. Anisminic v. EC.C., [1969] 1 All E.R. 208 (H.L.).
3. Re H.K. [1967] 2 Q.B. 617, [1967] 2 W.L.R. 962 (C.A.); R. v. Gaming Board Exparte
Benaim, [1970] 2 All E.R. 528 (C.A.); Wiseman v. Borneman, [1969] 3 W.L.R. 706, [1969]
3 All E.R. 275 (H.L.).
4. See the seminal essay Mullan, Fairness: The New Natural Justice [1975], U.T.L.J. 281. See
also Nicholson ,v. Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Bd. of Commrs. of Police, 19791 1 S.C.R. 311;
Martineau v. Matsqui Institution No. 2, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 311; Martineau v. Matsqui Institution
No. 2, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602; Grey, The Duty to Act Fairly after Nicholson (1980), 25 McGill
L.J. 598; and Can Fairness be Effective? (1982), 27 McGill L.J. 360.
5. R. v. Electricity Commissioners, [1924] 1 K.B. 171, [1923] All E.R. Rep. 150 (C.A.).
6. See especially Nakkuda All v. Jayaratne, [195 1] A.C. 66,94 Sol. Jo. 516 (P.C.)
7. See Calgary Power Ltd v. Copithorne, [1959] S.C.R. 24 and the Federal Court judgment
of Martineau v. Matsqui Institution No. 2, [1978] 1 P.C. 312 reversed at [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602.
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Reasonableness is, like jurisdiction, an old concept. Courts were
always ready to strike something unreasonable.8 This concept is,
however, undergoing a new revival9 and is particularly frequently being
invoked by some to restrict judicial review.10
These concepts have become the central ones in administrative law."
There are other important issues - the Charter,12 remedies, state
liability. 3 Furthermore, it is still useful to consider the separate categories
of judicial review such as bias, "no evidence", audi alteram partem, error
of law and so on. However with the concepts of jurisdiction, fairness and
reasonableness (which is closely connected to the exercise of discretion)
one can rationalize almost all of the voluminous jurisprudence and one
can justify most of it in policy terms.
Administrative law has at times been considered obtuse and obscure.
Recently, Vallerand J. A. wrote.' 4
Le droit administratif, en ce qu'il r~git le pouvoir de surveillance et de
r~forme des cours de juridiction sup~rieure, est devenu - qu'on me
pardonne ma f~rocit& - incoherent. Les nuances d'appoint viennent
"parfaire" les distinctions ponctuelles et, soit dit avec tons 6gards et autant
d'admiration h l'endroit de ceux qui s'y retrouvent encore, on ne s'y
retrouve plus guare. C'est qu'on a, je pense, laiss6 se perdre le caract&e
essentiel du recours qui est de la nature d'une supplique adress~e la Cour
de droit commun pour l'inviter, dans les cas qui le m~ritent, h r~primer les
abus de pouvoir, A faire prfvaloir la r~gle des hommes, A assurer le respect
de la justice naturelle, bref et essentiellement A faire intervenir une
conscience judiciaire indign~e.
There is no doubt that in the days of procedural refinements, arbitrary
distinctions 15 and uncertainty as to the purpose of judicial review 16, the
subject was exceedingly complicated and unnecessarily subtle. With the
new dominance of relatively simple concepts, and more obvious policy
8. SeeRoberts v. Hopwood, [1925] A.C. 578; A-G v. Tynemouth Union; [1930] 1 Ch. 616.
9. Secretary of State for Educ. and Science v. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council
(1977), A.C. 1014 (C.A.).
10. SeeBlanchardv. ControlData Canada Limited (1984), 55 N.R. 194.
11. Along with the concept of "discretion" discussed by this author at length in Grey,
Discretion in Administrative law (1979), 17 Osgoode Hall L.J. 107. See also Jones & de
Villars, supra, note I at c. 7 and Kpin & Ouellette, Prcis de Contentieux Administratif
(Editions Yvon Blais Inc. 1982).
12. See Jones & de Villars supra note 1 at 435. Of course, the Charter cannot meaningfully
be separated from any issue in public taw.
13. "Fashionable" issues change from decade to decade.
14. Per Vallerand J. Celanese Canada Inc. v. Mathieu et aL, [1983] RDJ 397 at 400 (Que.
C.A.).
15. Esp. judicial v. administrative decisions.
16. See Hogg, Judicial Review How Much Do We Need? (1974), 20 McGill L.J. 157 and
Angus, The Individual and the Bureaucracy: Judicial Review - Do We Need It (1974), 20
McGill LJ. 177.
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goals, we may reduce the subject to a wholesome simplicity, so that both
the government and the citizens can know and understand their rights. To
do so, we have to consider the fundamental concepts 1 one by one, and
then apply them to recent jurisprudence and to the policy of modern
administlative law.
II. Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction can be defined as the right usually coupled with a duty to
make a decision on an issue.'8 The decision may be right or wrong, but
it is final unless there is an appeal provided by statute, the decision-maker
commits an error of law on the face of the record 19 or jurisdiction is
exceeded or lost.
All jurisdiction is presumed to be vested in the superior or high court,
which is the general court of the land.20 This means that in order to show
that another body has jurisdiction or to rebut the presumption of
jurisdiction in the superior court, one has to show clear statutory
authority.2t Even then the superior court's jurisdiction cannot be ousted
entirely. 22
It follows, that any administrative or judicial body other than the
superior court of a province must show a statutory source for its
jurisdiction. One possible reason for finding a decision ultra vires is the
absence of such statutory authorization or, in other words, of ab initio
jurisdiction.
A decision made without ab initio jurisdiction is utterly void and of no
effect23 just as a decision outside the legislative limits of the provinces or
the federal government would be utterly void3-4 This -was made clear in
Re Syndicat des Employis and C.LR.B.25 where Beetz J. said:26
17. Except discretion where this writer would have little to add to his 1979 essay, supr4z note
11, save insofar as discretion and reasonableness are related.
18. There may be situations where there is no "duty" and where the decision-maker has an
option of declining jurisdiction. For instance, private international law has the concept of
"forum non conveniens". However in the vast majority of cases jurisdiction implies a duty to
decide. See Grey, Discretion; supra, note 11 at 110.
19. See supra, note 1. A privative clause will prevent review of this type of error Labrecque
v.A.G. Qua, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 1057.
20. See Board v. Board, [1919] A.C. 956 (P.C.). Three Rivers Boatman Ltd v. CLRB (1970),
12 D.L.R. (3d) 710 (S.C.C.). The fact that the jurisdiction is presumed to be vested in the
superior court is, along with the fact that legislative power is presumed to be usable in
Parliament, the basic principle of the British constitutional system.
21. See Board v. Board supra, note 20.
22. Crevier v. A.G. (Que) (1981), 2 S.C.R. 220; CLRB v. L'Anglais (1983), 1 S.C.R. 147.
Some element of judicial review must remain as it is constitutionally entrenched.
23. Harelkin v. University of Regina, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 561.
24. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (2nd ed. Toronto: Carswell 1985).
25. Re Syndicat des Employds and C.LR.B. (1984), 14 D.L.R. (4th) 457 (S.C.C.).
26. 1d at 479-480.
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Once a question is classified as one of jurisdiction, and has been the subject
of a decision by an administrative tribunal, the superior court exercising
the superintending and reforming power over that tribunal cannot,
without itself refusing to exercise its own jurisdiction, refrain from ruling
on the correctness of that decision, or rule on it by means of an
approximate criterion. This is why the superior courts which exercise the
power of juridical review do not and may not use the rule of the patently
unreasonable error once they have classified an error as jurisdictional.
Even where it exists at the start, jurisdiction can be lost in the course
of decision-making, either for faulty procedure27 or for untenable
results. 28 Where jurisdiction is lost in that way there results only a relative
nullity29 which means that the decision may yet be saved for discretionary
reasons, such as undue delay, acquiescence, the conduct of the aggrieved
party and so on.
It is thus clear that the view expressed in Anisminic that the word
"jurisdiction" stands for two concepts is still correct °30 One is the lack of
jurisdiction at the outset which leads to absolute nullity similar to that in
constitutional law, the other is caused by procedural error such as bias,
improper hearing and other types of unfairness and leads to relative and
flexible nullity.31
One, as yet unanswered question is whether the L'Anglais3 2 case
applies to all radically null decisions even if they do not have a "purely"
constitutional side3  to them. Can one attack such a decision in the
27. For example unfairness.
28. For example unreasonableness.
29. Harelkin, supra, note 23. This.matter was the subject of considerable debate. Articles by
Prof. Wade in (1967), 83 L.Q.R. 499 and (1968), 84 L.Q.R. 95 suggested that the nullity is
absolute. See also Wade Administrative Law (5th ed.) at 310-313. In Harelkin itself, Mr.
Justice Dickson's eloquent dissent illustrates the intensity of the debate. See also Jones'
comment on Harelkin, Discretionary Refusal ofJudicialReview (1980), 19 Alta. L.R. 483.
Initially, this writer was tempted to agree with the dissent. However, with time he has come
around to the utility of the distinction. Where jurisdiction exists ratione materie at the outset
the resulting nullity is surely not as serious as where a body invades an area of endeavor where
it has no business. If a losing party accepts the results and acts in accordance with it or waits
indefinitely there is no reason to annul it later. On the other hand where the power simply does
not exist it would be a grave risk to allow a decision to stand and thus to encourage straying
outside one's area.
30. Anisminic v. FCC, supra, note 2. The court was right in suggesting that different
terminology as to differentiate between the concepts would have been unfair and confusing at
this point, given the long tradition of use of the same terms.
31. It has not been determined which type of nullity results from unreasonable decisions; the
author will argue below that it is relative.
32. CLRB v. L'Anglais, supra, note 22. One must note Beetz J.'s words in Re Syndicat des
Employdes supra, note 25 at 481: Further, I do not see why different rules would be applied
in this regard depending on whether it concerns judicial review of an administrative or quasi-
judicial jurisdiction or judicial review of legislative authority over constitutional matters.
33. For example if no issue of division of power is present.
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superior courts even in matters normally submitted to the Federal Court?
The logical answer would seem positive since it is ultimately the superior
court's role to uphold the law and to determine what are the limits of ab
initio jurisdiction of all bodies in its jurisdiction. On the other hand,
where the issue is error of law, natural justice or fairness only, the Federal
Court Act can act as a successful privative clause, revoking judicial
review and then resuscitating it in a slightly different form. 34
It is finally useful to note in analyzing the concept of jurisdiction that
where jurisdiction is lost in the course of decision-making, one of the
other basic concepts such as unfairness or unreasonableness 35 must be
invoked for judicial review. Where there is an ab initio problem, the
concept of jurisdiction suffices by itself.
The differences between the concepts of ab initio jurisdiction and that
of loss of jurisdiction are so striking that one could usefully make a
linguistic distinction by calling the one "error as to jurisdiction" and the
other "jurisdictional error" or perhaps "error affecting jurisdiction".36 In
other words, the first type is error about the extent of one's jurisdiction,
and the other is not about jurisdiction at all, but it makes one lose it.
We conclude that jurisdiction, which is probably the most important
idea in administrative law,37 is one which has to be employed with care
and which can hide significant nuances. No explanation of the subject
matter can be achieved without a consistent and sensible employment of
it.
III. Fairness
Fairness in the modern context includes all that used to be called natural
justice as well as the "procedural fairness" in "administrative matters"
that became accepted as a result of judicial activity in the 1960's and
1970's.38
It had always been accepted that superior courts had the duty to quash
lower judicial and quasi-judicial decisions tainted by violations of natural
justice which was usually decomposed further into "audi alterampartem"
and "bias". This was so even in the period 1920-1965 when judicial
review was unfashionable save among very conservative circles.39 What
34. See Grey, Sections 96 to 100. A Defense (1985), 1 Admin. L.J. 3. Because of Crevier v.
A.G. Que., supra, note 22 it would probably be impossible to remove judicial review without
providing it somewhere else.
35. Or some more specific concept such as no evidence, bias etc.
36. See supra, note 2 discussion of Anisminic v. FCC where Lord Reid expressed regret at the
confusing and varied use of the word "jurisdiction".
37. And constitutional law as well.
38. See supra, note 3 and 4.
39. Because Canada was so much more conservative than Britain, it can be argued that this
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the courts of that period wanted to shelter from judicial review was the
so-called "administrative decisions" to which procedural safeguards had
no application.
The "procedural fairness" doctrine and jurisprudence40 introduced
"fairness" to administrative decisions. Initially, it was intended to provide
a lesser degree of procedural review for decisions which wereprimafacie
peremptory. Thus, Chief Justice Laskin spoke of a "half-way house"
between full natural justice and the previous absence of all review.41
However, the attempt to maintain the old distinction between quasi-
judicial and administrative decisions as a rigid borderline between two
standards was soon abandoned.
Even before Nicholson, 42 natural justice had been flexible. In Q.L.R.B.
v. Canadian Ingersoll-Rand,43 the Supreme Court had said that audi
alteram partem did not always mean a right to an oral hearing. The right
to cross-examine witnesses and to be represented by attorney had been
recognized in some contexts and not in others."
Once the doctrine of fairness was accepted, it was inevitable that the
idea of a clear-cut boundary be abandoned in favour of an infinitely
variable standard, in other words, a continuum. Different decisions
would require different degrees of fairness based on factors too numerous
to enumerate.45 This position was admirably expressed by Dickson, J. as
he then was in Coopers and Lybrand v. MNR46:
Administrative decision does not lend itself to rigid classification of
function. Instead, one finds realistically a continuum. As paradigms, at one
end of the spectrum are rent tribunals, labour boards and the like, the
decisions of which are eligible for review. At the other end are such
matters as the appointment of the head of a Crown corporation, or the
intellectual current did not fully arrive here until the 1950's and especially the Copithorne
decision, supra, note 7 and that it did not disappear until the late 1970's. See Grey The
Ideology of Administrative Law (1983), 13 Man. L.J. 35 for this author's view of the evolution
of administrative law.
40. See supra, note 3 and 4.
41: Nicholson, supra; note 4 at 321.
42. Nicholson, supra, note 4.
43. Q.LR.B. v. Canadian Ingersoll-Rand, [1968] S.C.R. 695; C.C.S.U v. Minister for Civil
Service, [1985] 1 A.C. 374 (H. of L.).
44. SeePett v. GreyhoundRacing Association, [1968] 2 W.L.R. 1471 (Eng. C.A.).
45. Some of these factors would clearly be the peremptory or judicial nature of the decision;
the type of power (i.e. emergency or security powers may be treated with greater deference),
see C.C.S.U. v. Minister for Civil Service, supra, note 43; the legislative context (that is, did the
legislator wish to shelter this provision?) and especially the consequences of the decision. That
is why in Kane v. The Board of Governors of the University of B.C. (1980), 31 N.R. 214, Mr.
Justice Dickson said at 221: "A high standard of justice is required when the right to continue
in one's profession or employment is at stake. [.. .J A disciplinary suspension can have grave
and permanent consequences upon a professional career."
46. Coopers andLybrandv. MNR (1979), 1 S.C.R. 495 at 505.
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decision to purchase a battleship, determination inappropriate to judicial
intervention. The examples at either end of the spectrum are easy to
resolve, but as one approaches the middle the task becomes less so. One
must weigh the factors for and against the conclusion that the decision
must be made on a judicial basis. Reasonable men balancing the same
factors may differ, but this does not connote uncertainty or ad hoc
adjudication; it merely reflects the myriad administrative decision-making
situations which may be encountered to which the reasonably well-
defined principles must be applied.
The effect of this statement is to eliminate for most purposes the
distinction between administrative and quasi-judicial functions and
therefore between fairness and natural justice47 and to replace it with a
continuum of different standards ranging from near unreviewability to
the requirement of a full trial.48 Of course the old distinction remains and
indeed is applied in Coopers and Lybrand 9 for purposes of the Federal
Court Act where it is enshrined in s. 28. However, it is no longer a
question of availability of judicial review, only of determining its forum.
The flexibility of fairness means the disappearance of technical
distinctions in this area of law. Fairness is common sense and solomonic
justice. The question asked is whether the procedure followed was right
in the circumstances. In that way, fairness is a vastly superior concept to
"natural justice" as we once knew it, which bristled with technical
refinements and which could only apply to quasi-judicial decisions. It is
also much simpler.
The problem of review of procedural error has been complicated
somewhat by the appearance of a new expression - fundamental justice.
This expression is not only used with increasing frequency, it is also
entrenched in s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and is found in
the Bill of Rights. It is too early to give an exhaustive definition of
fundamental justice, but early jurisprudence has made it look very much
like fairness under another name.50 In particular, in Singh v. ME151 Mr.
47. This had been foreshadowed in Canada in Scott v. Nova Scotia Rent Review Board
(1977), 81 D.L.R. 3rd 530 (N.S.C.A.).
48. The identity of natural justice and fairness is well illustrated by the famous statement that
"natural justice is but fairness writ large" in Furnell v. Whangarei High School Board [1973]
A.C. 660 (P.C.)
49. Coopers and Lybrand v. MNR, supra, note 46.
50. See Jamieson and The Queen (1982), 70 C.C.C. (2d) 430 (Que. S.C.); Kindler et aL,
Federal Court of Canada (F.C.T.D.) T-945-85, 1985-07-23. However, the recent case Re s.
94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act of British Columbia SCC Dec. 17, 1985 makes it clear that s.
7 protects more than procedure, however, broadly interpreted (esp. at 15, 33 per Lamer J. and
at 17 per Wilson J.). This seems to confirm the correctness of Re Mia and Medical Services
Commission of British Columbia (1984), 17 D.L.R. 4th 385. Re s. 94(2) was applied with
respect to parole condition in Litiwack v. National Parole Board Fed. C.TD. 2080-85 Feb. 27
1986 (Walsh J.). Obviously, fundamental justice covers natural justice and more besides.
51. Singhv.MEI, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.
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Justice Beetz introduces a continuum very similar to the one accepted
with respect to fairness.52
Although the content of fairness and fundamental justice is not
constant, certain basic principles are well defined since Nicholson5 3
Firstly, it is essential to inform a person affected by a decision of the
possibility that such a decision will be taken, of the reasons for it and to
give the person a reasonable opportunity to make representation. To
these principles may be added the self-evident one that the decision-
maker must keep and appear to keep an open mind until he has heard the
representations. The continuum means that "reasonable opportunity" or
the degree of detail of information provided may vary from case to case.
However, the presence of this function is a constant feature of fairness.54
It is obvious that lack of fairness need not amount to a total denial of
opportunity to make representations. It suffices that a person be
prevented from knowing a large portion of the case against him55 or from
presenting a sufficiently large portion of his case 56 for the subsequent
decision to be subject to quashing. If this were not so, nothing would be
easier to evade than the duty to act fairly.
Harelkin57 made unquestionable in Canada the assertion that a breach
of natural justice or fairness make a decision voidable only and therefore
may lead to a discretionary refusal of review.58 This is reasonable since
52. Singh v. ME, supra, note 51. He concluded that an application for refugee status requires
at least one oral hearing. This would not necessarily be so for matters with less serious
consequences.
53. Nicholson, supra, note 4 where Laskin C.J. said: "In my opinion, the appellant should
have been told why his services were no longer required and given an opportunity, whether
orally or in writing as the Board might determine, to respond. The Board itself, I would think,
would wish to be certain that it had not made a mistake in some fact or circumstance which
it deemed relevant to its determination. Once it had the appellant's response, it would be for
the Board to decide on what action to take, without its decision being reviewable elsewhere,
always presuming good faith. Such a course provides fairness to the appellant, and it is fair as
well as the Board's right, as a public authority to decide, once it had the appellants response,
whether a person in his position should be allowed to continue in office to the point where his
right to procedural protection was enlarged. Status in office deserves this minimal protection,
however brief the period for which the office is held."
See also Radulesco v. Canadian Human Rights Commission, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 407.
54. The strength of the Nicholson formulation can be seen from the constant references to it
in subsequent jurisprudence. See for instance Martineau no. 2, supra, note 4. A.G. Que. et aL
v. Pierre Miller, 500-09-000298-844, CAM, 7 May 1985 (Que. C.A.). The last case quotes at
length and is based totally on Nicholson. See also Grey, The Duty to Act Fairly After Nicholson
(1980), 25 McGill L.J. 598.
55. Radulesco, supra, note 53; Kane, supra, note 45.
56. Roberval Express Limited v. Union des Chauffeurs de Camion (1982), 1 R.D.J. 3
(S.C.C.); Tribunal - Avocats-3, [1981] D.D.C. 517 (Que. Trib. des Professions); Brethour v.
Law Society of British Columbia, [1951] 2 D.L.R. 138 (B.C.C.A.).
57. Harelkin, supra, note 23.
58. This applies to bias as well as failure to hear. See REG. Industries A.G. Canada, [1976]
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the error is in the procedure used and does not amount to a total
usurpation of power. It also increases the already considerable
discretionary power of the courts. It means that the courts have a
mandate to do justice and the positive law cannot become as large as
impediment to that goal as it used to be.
IV. Reasonableness
In addition to being within jurisdiction and being reached fairly, a
decision must be reasonable. Otherwise, a biased or unfair decision-
maker would only have to follow a prescribed ritual and his misuse of
power would never be discovered or quashed.5 9 This point was made
eloquently in Australia in Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v.
Pochi0 and now appears beyond doubt.61
The definition of unreasonable is often held to be the one given by
Lord Diplock in Tameside:2
In public law "unreasonable" as descriptive of the way in which a public
authority has purported to exercise a discretion vested in it by statute has
become a term of legal art. To fall within this expression it must be
conduct which no sensible authority acting with due appreciation of its
responsibilities would have decided to adopt.
The adjective "unreasonable" can refer to either law or fact as Lamer
J. pointed out recently.63
In looking for an error which might affect jurisdiction, the emphasis
placed by this court on the dichotomy of the reasonable or unreasonable
nature of the error casts doubt on the appropriateness of making, on this
basis, a distinction between error of law and error of fact. In addition to
the difficulty of classification, the distinction collides with that given by the
2 S.C.R. 739; Harelkin, supra, note 23; R. v. Aston University Senate, exp. Roffey (1969), 2
Q.B. 538 (Eng. Div. Ct.).
59. See Grey, Can Fairness be Effective? (1982), 27 McGill L.J. 360 where this writer wrote:
If the external forms of procedure were scrupulously observed it would still be possible for
grossly unfair decisions to be made. The fact that one side is given the chance to speak does
not mean that the other side is listening. It is certain that someone who is biased or determined
to take a particular course of action will often bend over backwards to appear even-handed or
indeed well-disposed. It would be sad if the sole effect of the growth of fairness was a
proliferation of manuals written to help officials clothe their decisions in the garb of
fairness...
It follows that in order to prevent fairness from becoming a sham there must be some
provision for review of questions of substance and not only procedure.
60. Minister ofImmigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Pochi (1981), 44 EL.R. 41 (EC. Aust.).
61. Especially since the Re s. 94(2) case supra, note 50 gave "fundamental justice" a
substantive meaning.
62. Secretary of State for Education and Science v. Tameside Metro Borough Council, supra,
9 at 1064.
63. Blanchard v. ControlData Canada, supra, note 10 at 215-216.
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courts to unreasonable errors of fact. The distinction would mean that this
error of law is then protected by the privative clause unless it is
unreasonable. What more is needed in order that an unreasonable finding
of fact, in becoming an error of law, becomes an unreasonable error of
law? An administrative tribunal has the necessary jurisdiction to make a
mistake, and even a serious one, but not to be unreasonable. The
unreasonable finding is no less fatal to jurisdiction because the finding is
one of fact rather than law. An unreasonable finding is one of fact rather
than law. An unreasonable finding is what justifies intervention by the
courts.
Not only is the distinction between error of law and of fact superfluous
in light of an unreasonable finding or conclusion, but the reference to error
itself is as well. Indeed, though all errors do not lead to unreasonable
findings, every unreasonable finding results from an error (whether of law,
fact, or a combination of the two), which is unreasonable.
If a decision is unreasonable in law, in fact, or as a result of a mixture
of the two, it is subject to judicial review. This is clear even in cases which
are frequently cited to restrain judicial review such as CUPP4 and
Blanchard65 What remains is to decide when a decision is classified as
unreasonable under the definition reproduced above.6 6 One can see three
types of situations where a decision could be unreasonable:
A) error of law
B) error of fact
C) misuse of discretion
The first case is simple. It is settled that a ruling of law is unreasonable
when no one could have reasonably interpreted a statute or other
document in the way in which it was done. In other words if the
reviewing court is certain of the correct interpretation, the opposite one
is unreasonable. If it merely leans one way or the other, it will hold
neither position to qualify as "unreasonable". A recent example of
unreasonable interpretation of law can be found in Miriam Homes v.
CUPE.67 It is obvious that plain errors of law are not rare. Lower courts
make them and are corrected by higher ones; a fortiori we can expect
administrative tribunals to make them and to be corrected. A number of
recent examples can be cited of this type of error being reviewed.68
In dismissing an application for review in Ventes Mercury des
64. CUPE v. N.B. Liquor Corporation (1979), 26 N.R. 341.
65. Blanchard v. Control Date Limited supra, note 10.
66. See Tameside, supra, note 62.
67. Miriam Homes v. CUPE, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 137. The word "patently" is often used to
modify "unreasonable". One can wonder if it adds much. See infra, note 202.
68. Commission Scolaire Jerome Le Royer v. Michael H. Cain et a4 [1984] C.S. 1103; Service
des Affairs Sociales de La Ville de Montreal et al v. Jacques St. Pierre et at [1983] C.A. 25
(leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused).
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Laurentides v. Bergevin, 69 Hannan J. set out the test with great lucidity
at 465:
The sections of the Act with which Bergevin was concerned have been
interpreted so as to provide at least two distinct schools of thought... As
in the New Brunswick liquor Corporation case, there is no one
interpretation which may be said to be right, either school may be
rationally supported by the texts in question. These considerations might
be sufficient to dispose of the petition by dismissing it.
Even if doubtful cases are not reviewed,70 there is still a large scope for
judicial review of unreasonable findings of law.
It is far harder to persuade a court that findings of fact are
unreasonable. In part, this is simply an extension of the general rule that
a trial judge is master of the facts and that his findings will not lightly be
disturbed.71 On the other hand, if a theory of curial deference is
established on issues of fact that goes beyond the ordinary appeal
practices, this will be an error. Surely error of fact is to be viewed in the
same light as error of law. If two views are rationally defensible, there
should be no review; but if any reasonable man would have decided
differently from a decision-maker, his decision should fall. Given the
relative ease with which errors of law can be reviewed if they are plain,
it would be regrettable if equally plain and therefore equally unjust errors
of fact remained without remedy.
It is not possible to limit review to situations where there is absence of
evidence. Absence of evidence is an error of law72 and Mr. Justice Lamer
has made it clear that unreasonableness can apply to issues of fact.73
Rather the superior courts can quash determinations of fact where there
is some evidence but where a serious and well-advised decision-maker
would not have made that decision on that basis. 4
It is pointless to try to list adjectives used for unreasonable
determination. Arbitrary, absurd, manifestly unjust, capricious, 75 have
been used. One can also suggest "irrational", "manifestly unfounded",
69. Ventes Mercury des Laurentides Inc v. Bergevin, [1983] C.S. 463.
70. Unless the error leads to a total lack or excess of jurisdiction.
71. See Mtivier v. Cadorette, [19771 S.C.R. 371 and Landry v. Lapointe (1980), 35 N.R. 91
for illustrations of this principle.
72. Labrecque v. A.G. Que., supra note 19; Kuziomko v. Commission des Affaires Sociales
(1985), 2 C.S. 566 (Que. S.C.).
73. Supra, note 63.
74. But Wade, Administrative Law, (5th ed., Oxford) at 287 quoted with approval in
Kuziomko, supra, note 72, suggests "no evidence" can be expanded to situations where there
is some but clearly insufficient evidence. Thus, as in most areas of law, the distinction between
error of law and error of fact is quite blurred.
75. See for instance Boulis v. MM, [1974] S.C.R. 875; Blanchard supra, note 63; Villaroel v.
MMI(1980), 31 N.R. 50 (EC.A.) esp. in note 6.
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"perverse" and some others. Perhaps the best way to summarize the
adjectives is to say that judicial review is possible whenever the
conclusion reached was not reasonably open to the decision maker.76
Some of the confusion may come from Mr. Justice Lamer's statement
at 214 in Blanchard with respect to unreasonableness. 7
This is a very severe test and signals a strict approach to the question of
judicial review.
"Severe" is, of course, a subjective word. Certainly the definition of
unreasonableness precludes judicial review from being an appeal. It never
was that, and the courts have made it very clear that they will not act as
courts of appeal from administrative action.78 On the other hand, on
issues of law, unreasonableness is not a rare finding. On questions of fact,
it is more rare,79 but it should still not be given such a "hard"
interpretation as to be of no practical effect.
It would be unfortunate if instead of the adjectives suggested above
words like "wild", "insane", "incoherent" and "dishonest" were
substituted. Fortunately, most administrative tribunals do not make that
sort of finding. To limit review to wild or insane findings would be to
restrict it to a few cases in each century. Moreover, wild or insane
findings would normally affect jurisdiction in the stricter sense; one
would not need to worry about unreasonableness.
Therefore, while it is obvious that findings of fact or credibility should
not lightly be disturbed on grounds of unreasonableness, one should
define "unreasonableness" as something that regularly, if infrequently
occurs, not as a completely unlikely and utterly scandalous finding that
a lawyer might expect to encounter once in a lifetime.80
The third type of unreasonable decision is the misuse of discretion.81
The difference between it and the two previous types is that here the
result is not "wrong" because discretion means that there is no right or
wrong answer. The problem is not "error" by the decision-maker in the
76. See Surujpalv. MEI(1985), 60 N.R. 73 and Rajudeen v. MEl(1984), 55 N.R. 73 recent
cases in which this test was applied with respect to refugee status and in which the Federal
Court precluded another unfavourable finding by stating that the only conclusion open was
that the applicant in each case was a refugee.
77. Blanchard supra, note 10.
78. Boulis v. MMI supra, note 75; Blanchard, supr, note 10. In a recent case SociN Radio-
Canada v. Lussier C.S. 500-05-003410-857, 15 October 1985 Lesyk J. underlined the
distinction between review and appeal.
79. See Wade, Administrative Law at note 1. See also Jones & de Villars, supra, note 1.
80. E.g. the events of Gershman v. Manitoba Vegetable Marketing Board, [1975] 65 D.L.R.
3d 181 (Man. Q.B.) affd in [1976] 69 D.L.R. 3d 114 (Man. C.A.)
81. See Grey, supra, note 11. Of course, this type of unreasonableness often coincides with the
previous type and cannot readily be isolated.
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result, but rather the making of the decision on improper, irrelevant or
illegal consideration.
In Oakwood Development Ltd v. Rural Municipality of St Xavier3 2
the Supreme court reaffirmed the importance of this ground for judicial
review. Madame Justice Wilson wrote at 17-18:
All the evidence supports the finding that the Council refused to hear any
information whatsoever regarding the potential flooding problem and
therefore failed to take proper account of factors relevant to its statutory
mandate. This finding leads inevitably to the conclusion that the
respondent failed to exercise its discretion in accordance with proper
principles.
This is not essentially different from Smith and Rhuland v. The
Queen83 or Leong Ba Chai.84 It has as always been clear that
discretionary decisions will be quashed if derived from improper
considerations. It is evident that decisions so derived are an illustration of
a particular type of unreasonableness and, like all unreasonable decisions,
cannot be sustained. They are different from other unreasonable decisions
in that the result may not be per se unreasonable and may well be open
to the well-instructed decision-maker, so long as he makes it on a relevant
basis. The effect is that, in many cases, the result will be the same after
the decision-maker has made a new determination.85 This, however, does
not take away from the initial position that a decision made on incorrect
consideration will not stand.
The consequences of an unreasonable decision have never been
discussed at great length. Is the situation akin to a breach of natural
justice with the result that the error is voidable or is it rather an error of
jurisdiction?
Despite the dearth of jurisprudence, it is now quite clear that an
unreasonable decision is voidable only. In Re Syndicat des Employis and
C.L.R.B.,86 Beetz, J. said at 463:
An error of this kind is treated as an act which is done arbitrarily or in bad
faith and is contrary to the principles of arbitral justice.
At 481 of the same judgment we read:
Conversely, when the court applies the patently unreasonable
interpretation rule it is always with respect to an error which an
82. Oakwood Development Ltd v. Rural Municipality of St. Xavier, S.C.C. 17017,
1985.09.19.
83. Smith and Rhuland v. The Queen, [19531 2 S.C.R. 95.
84. R. v. LeongBa Cha4 [1954] S.C.R. 10.
85. Unless the irrelevant ground is the only possible motive for the decision as in Smith and
Rhuland, supr, note 83.
86. Re Syndicat des Employs de Production and C.LR.B., supra, note 25.
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administration tribunal may have made in deciding a question considered
as falling within the limits of the jurisdiction.
Thus, unreasonable decisions will be subject to acquiescence, undue
delay and all the myriad other reasons why judicial review may be
refused in cases of breach of the duty to act fairly.87 The result is a sensible
one, since the error will have occurred in an area where the tribunal did
have power to act. It would not amount to a total usurpation but rather
to a misuse of power. Where there is total usurpation, it is difficult to see
how a decision could be saved without a threat to the integrity of our
political system; however, in a case of misuse, it is possible to see other
considerations outweighing the need for review. 88
V. Application of the basic concepts to recentjurisprudence
Once we have defined jurisdiction, fairness and reasonableness it is
necessary to show how they are used by the courts in current
administrative law. Before considering the cases, however, we must place
the whole area of law in a context.
Some judges and commentators have seen in the developments since
CUPE89 a restriction and reduction in judicial review. Dicta in certain
Supreme Court decisions lend strength to this theory. In Heustis v. N.B.
Electric Power Commission o Dickson, J. said at 781:
There is a very good policy reason for judicial restraint in fettering
adjudicators in the exercise of remedial powers. The whole purpose in
establishing a system of grievance adjudication under the Act is to secure
prompt, final and binding settlement of disputes.
This was textually quoted and emphasized in Blanchard91 Moreover, in
Syndicat des Professeurs du Collage Levis-Lauzon92 Beetz, J. said at 14:
... the principle of judicial restraint and the description of the procedure
that should be avoided if it is to be followed apply to an arbitration matter
and are still entirely relevant. This judgment93 is frequently cited, and the
policy stated recording limitation by judicial intervention has recently
been applied by the decision of this Court in Syndicat des Employds de
production du Quebec v. C.L.R.B.94
87. See Harelkin, supra, note 23.
88. Of course the more serious the misuse, the less likely it is that it will be allowed to remain.
For instance, bad faith vitiates almost anything. See Landreville v. Town of Boucherville
(1978), 22 N.R. 407 (S.C.C.).
89. CUPE v. N.B. Liquor Corporation, supra, note 64.
90. Heustis v. N.B. Electric Power Commission, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 768.
91. Blanchard, supra, note 10 at 209.
92. Syndicat des Professeurs v. CEGEP de Ldvis-Lauzon, [1985] 1 R.C.S. 596.
93. CUPE v. N.B. Liquor Corporation, supra, note 64.
94. Supra, note 25.
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It is this writer's thesis that, although the principle of a certain judicial
restraint cannot be doubted after these Supreme Court pronouncements,
nothing in any of these areas reduces the scope of judicial review hitherto
available or calls for a greater degree of restraint.
If any "reduction" took place, it would certainly be with reference to
ab initio juridiction rather than the other two concepts. The following
words of Dickson, J. in CUPE91 at 347 (N.R.) may be taken to have this
effect:
The courts, in my view, should not be alert to brand as jurisdictional, and
therefore subject to broader curial review, that which may be doubtfully
so.
In other words, the opinion of an arbitrator or other administrative
decision-maker on the extent of his jurisdiction will have some influence,
at least where the answer is not clear.96 In the past, it had often been said
that no one (except the superior court) can determine or influenze the
scope of his jurisdiction.
Arguably, this extends the principle of judicial restraint to minor or
uncertain questions of ab initio jurisdiction. However, a more convincing
explanation of the dictum and the subsequent decisions based on it, is the
court's desire to get rid of the technical and unnecessary terminology of
"collateral or preliminary questions". This terminology once had great
vogue.97 This was at a time when other technical distinctions9" were
commonly made in administrative law, and when procedural questions
were allowed to intrude upon the result.99 We now operate from different
premises; hence the need to remove the old distinctions.
The "collateral or preliminary question" became shaky after In re
Jacmain.'° In CUPET l Mr. Justice Dickson was more direct at 374:
With respect, I do not think that the language of "preliminary or collateral
matter" assists in the inquiry into the Board's jurisdiction.
An even stronger statement appears in Syndicat des Professeurs du
Collage de Livis-Lauzon10 2 at 12-13.
95. CUPE v. N.B. Liquor Corporation, supra, note 64.
96. Re Syndicat des Employds and C.L.R.B., supra, note 25, puts beyond dispute the
proposition that where the excess of jurisdiction is clear, nothing in the decision, however
reasonable, will prevent judicial review.
97. In Re Lunenburg Sea Products Ltd, [1947] 73 D.L.R. 195; Parkhill Bedding v.
International Molders (1961), 26 D.L.R. (2d) 589.
98. Notably the one between administrative and quasi-judicial decisions stemming from R. v.
Electricity Commissioner, supra, note 5.
99. See Vachon v. A.G. Que. [1979], 1 S.C.R. 555, for the end of this type of thinking.
100. Jacmain v. A.G. Can. et a. (1977), 18 N.R. 361.
101. CUPEv. N.B. Liquor Corporation, supra, note 64.
102. Syndicat des Professeurs v. CEGEPdeLdJvis-Lauzon, supra, note 89.
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First, it seems to me that by unnecessarily and, in my opinion, wrongly
separating the preliminary jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal from its
general or full jurisdiction, which when the grievance is not prescribed
consists in the power of hearing the grievance on the merits, the Court of
Appeal is actually impairing the integrity of the arbitration tribunal's
jurisdiction taken as a whole. It seems wrong to say that the full
jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal consist in hearing the grievance
when it is not prescribed. Rather it seems to me that the arbitration
tribunal's full jurisdiction consist in the power to dispose of grievances
before it by applying the relevant provisions of the collective agreement or
the law. It has jurisdiction to allow or dismiss these grievances, and its
jurisdiction is not placed in question because it allows or dismisses them
in accordance with one rather than another of the provisions of the
collective agreement.
By the dichotomy which it sets up between the initial jurisdiction of the
arbitration tribunal and its general jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal is
artificially transforming the question of prescription of the grievance into
one of conferring or, depending on the circumstances, divesting
jurisdiction, but only jurisdiction in the narrow sense of the power to
dispose of the grievance on one ground rather than on another. As I have
just indicated, in my opinion the arbitrator's jurisdiction is wider than that.
Moreover, the method used by the Court of Appeal which, in the case
at bar, consists of considering the question of prescription of the grievance
as a preliminary matter on which the arbitration tribunal's jurisdiction
depends is one which has attracted some support but against which this
Court finally warned the courts in C.UPE. v. New Brunswick Liquor
Corporation, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227.
This means that "a priori jurisdiction" means not questions that must
in fact be settled before the merits of a matter are heard, but rather
questions which could be settled at the outset if posed. As Dickson, 3.
said in CUPE0 3 speaking of the distinction he was in essence
disapproving:
Underlying this sort of language is, however, another, and in my opinion,
a preferable approach to jurisdictional problems, namely that jurisdiction
is typically to be determined at the outset of the inquiry.
If jurisdiction is not to be decided at the outset of an inquiry on arid
and arbitrary distinctions, it must be connected to some rational policy
objectives. CUPE 10 4 puts forward an immediately appealing one:05
The rationale for protection of a labour board's decisions within
jurisdiction is straightforward and compelling. The labour board is a
specialized tribunal which administers a comprehensive statute regulating
103. CUPE v. N.B. Liquor Corporation, supra, note 64 at 347.
104. CUPE v. NB. Liquor Corporation, supra, note 64. Heustis, supra, note 90 expresses the
same idea. It is not surprising that both judgments were written by the same judge in the same
year.
105. CUPE v. N.B. Liquor Corporation, supr, note 64 at 344.
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labour relations. In the administration of that regime, a board is called
upon not only to find facts, decide questions of law, but also to exercise its
understanding of the body of jurisprudence that has developed around the
collective bargaining system, as understood in Canada, and its labour
relations sense acquired from accumulated experience in the area.
It follows that whether or not a board exceeds its a priori jurisdiction
is to be decided not on any technical formula for determining jurisdiction
but rather with reference to the Board's purpose, specialization and
experience. One should ask not whether a question is collateral or
preliminary but rather whether it is, in Dickson, J.'s language, 106 "at the
heart of the specialized jurisdiction confided to the Board." If it is, and if
the Board has special competence and experience to answer it, the Courts
should show restraint and quash only decisions which are manifestly
untenable. If, on the other hand, a question has nothing to do with the
Board's special functions, no restraint is necessary.
The latter principle is w~el-illustiated whenevey an administiatie
decision-maker is called upon to interpret laws of general application not
forming part of his specialized area and potentially affecting his
jurisdiction. The leading case is McLeod v. Egan.10 7 At 518-519 Laskin,
C.J.C. said:
Although the issue before the arbitrator arose by virtue of a grievance
under a collective agreement, it became necessary for him to go outside the
collective agreement and to construe and apply a statute which was not a
projection of the collective bargaining relations of the parties but a general
public enactment of the superior provincial Legislature. On such a matter
there can be no policy of curial deference to the adjudication of an
arbitrator...
That this is still the state of the law is evident from Re Service Employees
International Union'08 and Re Retail Wholesale and Departmental Store
Union.109 In both of these cases, Canadian courts of appeal denied any
broad protection from review to labour arbitrators or labour relations
boards construing the general provisions of the law as opposed to their
narrow areas of special knowledge. It follows that courts will not hesitate
to grant judicial review where the decision-maker has misapplied public
statutes, human rights charters"0 or even the common law. However,
106. CUPE v. NB. Liquor Corporation, supra, note 64 at 350.
117. McLeod v. Egan, 11915) 1 S.C.R. 517.
108. Re Service Employees International Union and Local 204 et aL (1984), 13 D.L.R. (4th)
220 (Ont. C.A.).
109. Re Retail Wholesale and Department Store Union (1982), 137 D.L.R. (3d) 524 (Sask.
C.A.).
110. We are speaking of the provincial unentrenched charters and the Bill of Rights. It goes
without saying that since the Canadian Charter of Rights is part of the Constitution, any
violation of it is illegal and presumably gives rise to a remedy under s. 24. In Howard v. Stony
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they will be reluctant to interfere with arguably jurisdictional errors that
are within the administrator's special area and presumably special
knowledge.
Viewed in this manner, CUPE"' is less a restriction than a clarification
of judicial review. It is easy to understand that, in submitting problems to
adjudicators other than superior court judges, the legislator intends a
quick solution by experts in the area, rather than the slower, purely legal
solution that the court would bring. As long as the experts stay within
their field, review will be possible only for clear excess of jurisdiction,
unfairness or unreasonableness. Once the decision-maker goes outside his
field, there is no rationale for deferring to his views. The best expert in
law is the court. If the error is strictly non-jurisdictional, it may yet be
overlooked or may amount only to error of law on the face of the
record.' 12 But if the decision-maker decides a jurisdictional question and
has no special skill on that issue, his decision will be upheld only if the
court agrees with him. In any other case, it will be entitled to quash.113
It follows that the debate on this type of issue has been radically
altered. Instead of an arid and legalistic discussion of terms like
jurisdiction, the court of judicial review will ask itself a series of
questions. It is submitted that these questions can be put as follows:
a) What is the purpose and the special expertise of the tribunal?
b) Is the impugned decision a power within that special competence?
c) If it is not, is it right in law or is the error clearly within the Tribunal's
jurisdiction? In such cases, it will be upheld.
d) If it is, is it arguably right in law, or is the error within jurisdiction?11 4
Again, in such cases, it will be upheld.
In the last case, one will give considerable weight to the decision-
maker's view and expertise and that is, perhaps, the one change which
tends to decrease the number of successful applications for review. On
the other hand, it may be more correct to see this as a rephrasing and not
a restriction of review, and as part of the trend away from technicalities
in all areas of law and particularly in this one.
The second concept, fairness has, since Nicholson, s been applied with
the greatest consistency and clarity. Each decision has its own level of
fairness, but that almost invariably includes the duty to acquaint the
Mountain Institution Inmate Disciplinary Court (1985), 57 N.R. 280 (F.C.A.) at 292-293 we
see that a denial of a Charter right by a prison tribunal cannot be a final adjudication of the
right, immune from review.
I 11. CUPE v. N.B. Liquor Corporation, supra, note 64.
112. See Labrecque v. A.G. Que., supra, note 19 for an example of this.
113. This is so, whether or not the impugned decision is reasonable, arguable or desirable.
114. This is, of course, before we pose questions about the fairness of the procedure or the
reasonableness of the result, both of which could, of course, constitute grounds for review.
115. Nicholson, supr, note 4.
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person affected with the issue and the reasons for the possible decision
and the duty to give him a reasonable opportunity to dissuade or
persuade the decision-maker. As the Supreme Court recently showed,116
this almost always means showing the entire file to the person" 7 or at
least disclosing its substance. In Daganayasi v. Miniswr of Immigration,Utt
Cooke, J. said:
But, while those implications in favour of the Minister's freedom seem to
be called for, I regard it as no less reasonable and no less necessary to the
interests of justice and fairness and to make the section work more
effectively, to hold that the reports of the appointed referee, or at least the
substance of any prejudicial contents, should be disclosed to the appellant
or a representative of the appellant before any adverse decision is made.
... The appellant should have a fair opportunity of correcting and
contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to his or her view.
The same formulation can be found in a recent judgment of the Quebec
Court of Appeal in A. G. Que -q. Miller:u 9
I1 est clair du dossier que l'intim& n'a pas 6t6 mis au courant de la preuve
qui avait 6 recueillie contre lui et n'a pas eu, en cons6quence,
l'opportunit6 de la contredire.
These principles are not seriously in doubt. They are constantly
applied and quoted.' 20 Recently, they have been extended to
commissions of inquiry.' 2' On the surface, fairness appears well-
established, especially if one considers its shaky beginnings in Canada. 22
Yet some caution and therefore some concern must remain.
The frailty of fairness becomes apparent when one considers the
judgment of Marceau, J., fortunately in the minority on that point, in
Lewis v. CE where the learned judge questioned the very application of
the notion of fairness to the federal civil service.'23 One cannot help
concluding that the achievement of the duty to act fairly could yet be
reversed by one or two restrictive decision. The Federal Court of Appeal
116. Radulesco v. Canadian Human Rights Commission, supra, note 53. See also Singh,
supra, note 51.
117. Obviously, there may be exceptions (e.g. national security).
118. Daganayasi v. Minister ofmmigration, [1980] 2 N.Z.L.R. 130 at 143.
119. A.G. Que- et aL v. Miller, supra, note 54, per Jacques.
120. To cite some recent cases: Re Prysiazniuck and Regional Municipality of Hamilton-
Wentworth (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 339; ReLadney et aL (1984), 10 D.L.R. (4th) 612.
121. Desormeaux v. C6tg, 119B51 C.S. 522; The Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers' Council
et aL v. The National Farm Products Marketing Council, F.C.T.D. T-2014-85 (Cullen, J.). See
infra, note 140 for this case's subsequent history.
122. See Mullan, Fairness: The New Natural Justice (1975), 25 U.T.L.J. 281; Laughlin,
Procedure Fairness: A Study of the Crisis in Administration Law Theory (1978), 28 U.T.L.J.
215.
123. Lewis v. Canadian Employment and Immigration Commission (1985), 60 N.R. 14. See
also Siclait v. ME, F.C.T.D. T-5569-78, Sept. 24, 1979.
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is particularly conservative in this regard and its jurisprudence, on the
whole, lags behind the other Canadian courts. 124
It follows that despite the constant progress made by advocates of a
meaningful doctrine of fairness in recent years, and despite their repeated
successes in Utigatioi, it would be dangeyous for them to consider thely
accomplishment irreversible and to rest on their laurels.
The danger is exacerbated by certain recent decisions of the House of
Lords. In C.C.S. U v. Minister for Civil Service125 and In re Findlay,126
the right to minimal consultation was declared dependent upon
"expectation", that is, whether the person could properly have expected
to be consulted. Theoretically, that may be quite acceptable. After all,
public law must place some limit on the people entitled to be heard, just
as private law must place limits on those entitled to sue in tort or delict. 27
However, the tone of the House of Lords is distinctly restrictive as to the
application of fairness and, given the notion's persistent frailty, it is
probably not desirable to dwell on the limits of fairness but rather to
stress the strong presumption in its favour. 28
Other limits on the doctrine of fairness also loom large. Legislative and
quasi-legislative powers are often exempted from review on fairness and
Inuit Tapirisat129 is undoubtedly the best-known example. The result may
be tempered somewhat by dicta in Operation Dismantle30 at least where
Charter rights are affected. Nevertheless, much unfairness could be
excused under this exception.
Another threat is possible characterization of public functions as
124. There are, of course, some very different iudgments, e.g. Howard v. Stony Mountain
Institution Inmate Disciplinary Court, supra, note 110. Mr. Justice MacGuigan, especially has
helped to decrease the gap between the Federal Court of Appeal and other Canadian Courts.
However, see Schavernoch v. FCC No. 2, F.C.A.D. A- 484-85, and Wilson v. Minister of
Justice (1985), 60 N.R. 194 for examples of the conservatism and proceduralism no longer
common in other Canadian jurisdictions. It must be added, however, that the Wilson decision
is not conservative in its substantive pronouncements, only in its proceduralism.
125. C.C.S.U. v. Minister for Civil Service, supra, note 43.
126. In re Findlay, [1985] 1 A.C. 318. The doctrine of "legitimate expectation" seems well-
established in England. See, for instance, R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex.
p. AsifMahmoodKhan (1984), 1 W.L.R. 1337.
127. Through notions like "duty of care" in common law and directness in civil law.
128. It is important to note that, in both cases, judicial review was denied in order to protect
government control over policy - a weak ground, since the application of the doctrine of
faitness inno w pre ludes an exercise. of discretion.
129. A.G. Canada v. Inuit Tapirisat of Canada et al [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735. The Court
underlined that there was possible judicial review, but not on grounds of fairness.
130. Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441. Another case which weakens
Inuit Tapirisat or at least makes it less absolute is Desjardins v. Bouchard (1982), 7 D.L.R.
(4th) 644 (F.C.A.). This is one of the cases which shows how unreliable generalizing about
"conservative" and "liberal" courts can be, since it was rendered by the Federal Court of
Appeal.
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matters of private law. This happened in Maligne Buildings,131 and less
directly in Re Bondarchuk. 132
It is readily apparent that judges who are not content with the
developments in the area of fairness, have numerous ways of
distinguishing cases and principles, so only the most inexeusable bveaches
would be sanctioned.
Nevertheless, in the majority of Canadian courts, unfairness is a
leading and perhaps the most established ground for judicial review. In
the recent case Re Bennett1 33 the Ontario Court of Appeal quoted an
earlier decision, Re Webb 134 as follows:
The Courts are, however, increasingly applying the test of procedural
"fairness" by administrative actions of donees of a power and there is
understandably and naturally, a predilection towards seeing that everyone
is treated "fairly".
A similar attitude is found in numerous other decisions. 135 The insistence
that the principles of fairness be respected is evident, for example, in the
reluctance of the courts to hold that a breach makes no difference, since
the evidence obtained unfairly did not in fact influence the decision-
maker. In Kane v. UBC,136 Mr. Justice Dickson said at 223 (N.R.):137
The court will not inquire whether the evidence did work to the prejudice
of one of the parties; it is sufficient that it might have done so.
This was recently applied to commissions of inquiry so long as they had
a real effect on the persons involved. 138 In In the Matter of SS. 4 and 8
of the Farm Products Marketing Agencies Act,139 Cullen, J. said at 20:
Did the Respondent rely on the study? Whether it did or will is irrelevant
and the law is quite clear on that subject. 140
131. Maligne Buildings Ltd v. The Queen (1982), 131 D.L.R. (3d) 704 (FC.T.D.), But see Re
Prysiazniuk and Regional Municipal of Hamilton- Wentworth, supra, note 120.
132. Re Bondarchuk and Administrator of Yukon (1981), 127 D.L.R. (3d) 467 (Yukon C.A.;
leave for appeal to S.C.C. denied). This case is based on dicta in Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C.
40 about offices held at pleasure which should not be reconsidered in view of Nicholson, supra,
note 4.
133. Re Bennett and WilfridLaurier University (1984), 48 O.R. (2d) 122 (C.A.).
134. Re Webb and Ontario Housing Corp. (1978), 22 O.R. (2d) 257 at 261; 93 D.L.R. (3d)
187 at 191.
135. See for instance Simlotte v. Council of the Association of Professional Engineers
Geologists and Geophysicists of Alberta [1983] 4 W.WR. 406; McCarthy v. A.G. Canada
(1980J), 80 C.L.L.C. (Fed. C.A.); Re Stumbillich and Health Disciplines Board (194), 12
D.L.R. (4th) 156 (Ont. C.A.) and Hoo Foo Tam v. MEI(1982), 46 N.R. I (Fed. C.A.).
136. Kane v. U.B.C. Bd of Governors, supra, note 45.
137. See also Mehr v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [1955] S.C.R. 344.
138. Until several years ago, inquiries were considered exempt at least in Canada: Guay v.
Lafleur(1985), S.C.R. 12; B. v. Commission of Inquiry, [1975] FC. 602 (T.D.).
139. The Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers' Council supra, note 121.
140. Cullen, J. went on to cite Mehr, supra, note 137. The Tobacco case supra, note 121, was
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By far the most important recent reaffirmation of the doctrine of
fairness is found in Cardinal et al v. The Director of Kent Institution.141
The case involved the right of a prison director to segregate certain
prisoners for security reasons - a discretionary power, par excellence.
Nevertheless, Le Dain J. wrote at 12 of the judgment.142
This Court has affirmed that there is, as a general common law principle,
a duty of procedural fairness lying on every public authority making an
administrative decision which is not of legislative nature and which affects
the rights, privileges or interests of an individual ... Although
administrative segregation is distinguished from punitive or disciplinary
segregation ... its effect on the inmate in either case in the same and is
such as to give rise to a duty to act fairly.
Thus, there should no longer be any problem with the false distinction
between "rights" and "privileges", which the Supreme Court has been
criticizing for quite some time.143 One cannot affect other people,
regardless of how one characterizes the nature of their claims, without
giving them an opportunity to respond. 1'
Another very important aspect of Le Dain J.'s judgment is found at24.145
.. I find it necessary to affirm that the denial of a right to a fair hearing
must always render a decision invalid, whether or not it may appear to a
reviewing court that the hearing would likely have resulted in a different
decision. The right to a fair hearing must be regarded as an independent
unqualified right which finds its essential justification in the sense of
procedural justice which any person affected by an administrative decision
is entitled to have. It is not for a court to deny that right and sense ofjustice
on the basis of speculation as to what the result might have been had there
been a hearing.
Thus the doctrine of Kane146 is clearly and unambiguously applied to
substantially confirmed in A-785-85 March 6, 1986. The "harder" case of Re Rohm andHans
(1979), 91 D.L.R. (3d) 212 (Fed. C.A.) is almost certainly wrong and is in any case
distinguishable because of the phrasing of 28.
141. Real Cardinal and Eric Oswald v. The Director of Kent Institution (1985), 63 N.R. 353.
142. Id at 358. This paragraph was quoted and applied in Portnoy v. Mendelson et al Que.
S.C. 500-05-000068-864 (Paradis J.)
143. See Martineau no. 2, supra, note 7, per Dickson, J. and Singh v. MEI supra, note 51. In
each of these cases, dicta critical of the distinction were made by a minority of judges(Martineau No. 2) or by half (Singh). Some judges continued to apply the distinction see
(Siclait v. ME, supra note 123). Now there is a clear judgment of the Supreme Court that
fairness is in no way connected to such a distinction.
144. We cannot forget that once we accept the statement of Rand J. in Roncarelli v.
Duplessi, [1959] S.C.R. 121 that there is no such thing as an untrammelled discretion in our
public law, it follows that any "privilege" is at least a "right to be considered."
145. Cardinal supra, note 141 at 362.
146. Kane v. UB.C., supra, note 45. See also Re Murphy and Minister of Consumer and
CommercialRelations (1985), 22 D.L.R. (4th) 240 (Ont. Div. Ct.).
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administrative decisions unfairly reached and not only to quasi-judicial
ones.
Another question which appears to have been answered in a way
favourable to judicial review is who must observe the duty to act fairly.
Nicholson 47 itself clearly recognizes that some aspects of fairness may be
subdelegated. Desardins148 points out that it would be unreasonable to
expect the Governor-General in person to give oral hearings personally to
individuals threatened with the revocation of their pardons. However, all
this does not mean that the ultimate duty to act fairly can be
subdelegated. The actual decision-maker must give the opportunity to
persuade him to the person affected, whether they meet eye to eye or not,
and the representations made must be considered by the actual decision-
maker, not someone else. This was affirmed in Re Evershed 49 and is a
logical conclusion, since on the opposite view fairness could easily
degenerate into a show.
In short, notice has been given to Canadian decision-makers that they
must be fair to all parties. If they do not respect this injunction, Courts
will not accept their affidavits to the effect that their unfairness did not
affect the outcome'50 and will, on the whole, refuse to excuse the unfair
conduct unless it could not have played any role at all
Another aspect of the liberalization of fairness and of all of judicial
review has been the demotion of procedure and remedies to a minor
question.' 5' This was particularly evident in Beson et aL v. Director of
Child Welfare for Province of Newfoundland152 At 612 Wilson, J. said:
Moreover, an application for judicial review might well have been
successful on the ground of the Director's failure to treat the Besons
fairly.... The Newfoundland Court of Appeal found as a fact that they
had been treated unfairly.... However, instead of proceeding by way of
judicial review the appellant instituted habeas corpus proceedings and the
Newfoundland Courts concluded, in my view wrongly, that they were
without jurisdiction to deal with the matter, I have concluded that it was
open to them to proceed with judicial review in exercise of their "parens
patriae" jurisdiction.
147. Nicholson, supra, note 4.
148. Desardins v. Bouchard, supra, note 130.
149. Re Evershed and the Queen [1984] 5 D.L.R. (4th) 340 (Ont. Div. Ct.) affirmed in
(1985), 17 D.L.R. (4th) 168 (Ont. C.A.).
150. If the opposite result had been reached, judicial review would be impossible save in cases
of manifest error and bad faith.
151. See Vachon v. A.G. Que., supra, note 90.
152. Beson et aL v. Director of Child Welfarefor Province of Newfoundland et aL (1982), 44
N.R. 602 (S.C.C.)
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A similar lack of concern for procedure appears from Jimenez-Perez v.
MEP53 where the Supreme Court granted a declaration without
statement of claim under s. 18 of the Federal Court Act - something
which the Federal Court had refused to do.154
In short, unfairness will not be made good by an opposing attorney's
errors or by technicalities. It may be that a party's conduct will lead to the
dismissal of an application, 155 but vagaries and uncertainties of the legal
systems will not be permitted to have that effect.
The third concept, reasonableness, is the least clearly defined. We have
seen that it applies to both questions of fact and questions of law. 56
Indeed, it is the necessary companion of fairness. It is important that
fairness not become a dry formula employed by prudent decision-makers
who are really not listening. Since there is normally no appeal on the
merits, one may think that, after listening to both parties, the decision-
maker may do as he pleases. Yet common sense tells us there must be a
limit. Reasonableness is that limit. A decision will not be disturbed so
long as a reasonable man could have reached it on the basis of the facts
and the law before him. However, if it is unreasonable, it must be
overturned or we abandon our notion of responsible democracy for
capricious despotism.
If courts intervene too readily and call any decision about which they
have doubts unreasonable, the administrative process will be destroyed
and courts will be running public affairs, a task for which they lack the
resources and which in time would destroy the impartiality and affect the
respect in which they are held. On the other hand, if they intervene too
rarely and set up too many artificial barriers or equate unreasonableness
with insanity, the rule of law will no longer be seen to prevail and the
courts will not be performing an essential part of their role. 57 It follows
that defining the limits of reasonableness requires fine and subtle
calibration, and that is what the courts are presently engaged in.
There is no doubt that "wrong" is a different concept from
"unreasonable" and that it does not suffice for a decision to be "wrong"
for it to be quashed. On the other hand nothing in law and common sense
requires that "unreasonable" be given such a narrow meaning'as to apply
153. Jimenez-Perez v. MEI (1984), 14 D.L.R. (4th) 609. This case did not directly involve
fairness.
154. B. v. Commission of Inquiry, supra, note 138. It follows that the old distinction is now
dead.
155. Harelkin, supra, note 23; Re Jow and Board of Governors of Regina General Hospital
(1979), 100 D.L.R. (3d) 98 (Sask. C.A.).
156. Supra, note 63.
157. It stands to reason that if defeat becomes almost always the fate of an application for
judicial review on grounds of unreasonableness, parties will not want to bear the risk of costs
and the expense of litigation, and the remedy will fall into disuetude.
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only to wild, irrational abuses of power. This problem has been raised
before, when the definition of unreasonable only was considered. 15 It
must be discussed again to chart the trends of recent jurisprudence, and
the importance of the issue justifies giving it prominence several times.
On issues of law, or statutory construction, the definition of
unreasonablness appears established. An unreasonable decision is one
which is not arguable or cannot rationally be sustained. If two positions
are possible, neither one is unreasonable although a court may prefer one
over the other. However, if a decision seems clearly and indisputably
wrong to a court, it is entitled to interfere.
This type of "unreasonableness" is not rare. The Supreme Court,
which has on the whole exercised restraint in quashing decisions in the
labour relations field, has nevertheless found it necessary to declare a
labour decision unreasonable. In Miriam Homes 59 Chouinard, J.
quashed an interpretation of a collective agreement which, while not wild
or utterly devoid of sense, was one which the words could not bear. Even
more significant is the decision The National Bank of Canada 160 While
the issue was one of law rather than fact, it involved not the
"unreasonable" interpretation of a written instrument, but rather an
unreasonable result - something which could be applied to issues of
fact. The short judgment of Beetz, J. is particularly instuctive. At 31 he
writes:16'
There is nothing to show that such were in fact their views and sentiments.
However admirable the objectives and provisions of the Code may be, no
one is obliged to approve of them: anyone may criticize them, like any
other statute, and seek to have them amended or repealed, though
complying with them so long as they are in effect.
Remedies Nos. 5 and 6 thus force the bank and its president to do
something, and to write a letter, which may be misleading or untrue.
This type of penalty is totalitarian and as such alien to the tradition of
free nations like Canada, even for the repression of the most serious
crimes. I cannot be persuaded that the Parliament of Canada intended to
confer on the Canada Labour Relations Board the power to impose such
extreme measures, even assuming that it could confer such a power
bearing in mind the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which
guarantees freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression. These
freedoms guarantee to every person the right to express the opinions he
may have: a fortiori they must prohibit compelling anyone to utter
opinions that are not his own.
This last case is rather different from most. However, one can quote a
158. See supra note 72 at note 80.
159. Centre d'Accueil Miriam v. CUPE, supra, note 67.
160. Re National Bank andRetail Clerks' Union (1984), 9 D.L.R. (4th) 10. See comments on
this case in Syndicat des Employis de Production and C.L.B., supra, note 25.
161. Id. at 31.
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large number of cases where decisions were quashed as unreasonable
without being totally absurd. 162 In some cases, the error may be plain
jurisidictional error reviewable whether or not it is unreasonable. 63
However, in most cases, we have an untenable construction of a statute
or collective agreement. What is important is the fact that an
"unreasonable" construction need not be a totally gratuitous, irrational,
unjust or capricious one. It is sufficient that it be clearly wrong.
One of the best examples of this, although it does not use the
characteristic terminology of labour cases following CUPE v. New
Brunswick Liquor,164 is Blanco v. Rental Commission.165 At 830 Beetz, J.
said:
Section 17 of the Conciliation Act contains a privative clause which places
the administrative and the Rental Commission outside the supervisory
power of the Superior Court. They may therefore err in the exercise of
their jurisdiction but they may not, by a mistaken interpretation of the law,
appropriate jurisdiction which they do not have or decline that which they
do have.
No one can doubt these words but as Beetz, J. himself noted, 166 "It is
their application to specific case which sometimes gives rise to difficulty".
If one were to apply Blanchard,67 CUPE,168 and Syndicat des Employis
de Production169 to Blanco,170 one would conclude that either the error
was so clearly jurisdictional ab initio that it did not matter how
162. See note 75 above and the discussion around it. See also British Columbia Telephone
Company v. Telecommunications Workers' Union, [1985] 6 WWR. 214 (B.C.C.A.); Re
United Steelworkers of America Local 6204 et el (1981), 128 D.L.R. (3d) 715 (Nfld. C.A.);
Re Cornier and Alberta Human Rights Commission et at (1984), 14 D.L.R. (4th) 55 (Alta
Q.B.); Re Dominion Stores et at (1981), 128 D.L.R. (3d) 262 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Lavalin Inc. v.
Deslierres, [1983] C.S. 470 (Que. S.C.); Re Queen's University and Fraser (1985), 19 D.L.R.
(4th) 240 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Commission Scolaire Jdr~me Le Royer v. Cain, [1984] C.S. 1103
(Que. S.C.); Ville de Broisbriand v. Lefebvre, [1984] C.S. 666 (Que. S.C.); Re United Nurses
ofAlberta and High Prairie General Hospital (1985), 17 D.L.R. (4th) 532 (Alta. Q.B.). In this
context the recent Ontario Court of Appeal judgment of Ontario Public Service Employees
Union et al (1985), 52 OR 705 appears very disappointing and inconsistent with most
Canadian jurisprudence.
163. See Re Syndicat des Employs de Production and C.L.R.B., supra, note 25. However, in
all of these cases the decision is one within the special competence of the administrative
decison-maker and in none of them is the excess of jurisdiction so striking as to be obvious to
anyone reading them.
164. CUPE v. N.B. Liquor Corporation, supra, note 64.
165. Blanco v. Rental Commission, [19801 2 S.C.R. 827. The terminology is probably not
used because Blanco is not a labour case and there has been a different treatment given to
labour cases as opposed to other public law cases.
166. Id at 830.
167. Blanchard v. ControlData, supra, note 10.
168. CUPE v. New Brunswick Liquor, supra, note 64.
169. Syndicat de Production and C.L.R.B., supra, note 25.
170. Blanco, supra note 165.
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reasonable it was or, more plausibly, that because the Rental
Commission's interpretation of the law was clearly and indisputably
wrong and no reasonable person could have interpreted it that way, it
was unreasonable and therefore ultra vires. 171
If Beetz, J. noted a difficulty with respect to the application of these
principles, the difficulty is doubled when the error is one of fact. Facts are
traditionally harder to review than law and the trier of fact is given very
great latitude.172 Nevertheless, limits exist, both where the error of fact is
clearly jurisdictional 73 ab initio and where the result is capricious and
manifestly unacceptable. a74 As Blanchard'75 shows us, courts are slow to
find that a decision is unreasonable in this sense. They do not feel as
comfortable here as in quashing error of law which, after all, are in their
special expertise. However, unless they do intervene from time to time
and not only when the decision is monstrous or in bad faith, an area of
law will be left without effective remedy for abuse.
It is submitted that the notion of "no evidence" is one way of
correcting unreasonable decisions. 76 If a decision is made without
evidence it is unreasonable, even if the same decision could legitimately
have been made on proper evidence. The relationship between "no
evidence" and "unreasonableness" becomes more obvious when one
considers the following statement of Wade:177
No evidence does not mean only a total dearth of evidence. It extends to
any case where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable
of supporting the finding or where, in other words, no tribunal could
reasonably reach this conclusion on that evidence.
171. The consequence - desirable, it is submitted - is that the error in Blanco, supra, note
165 was voidable in the sense of Harelkin, supra, note 23 and not void. In other words, if
Blanco had come forward years later, the court would have been justified in refusing relief.
172. See Wade, Administrative Law, (5th ed.) at 287: These principles are even applicable to
Courts of Appeal vis-A-vis the first instance triers of fact.
173. Belly. Ontario Human Rights Commission, [1971] S.C.R. 756.
174. An excellent example of this can be found in Bandag Canada Ltee v. Syndicat National
des Employdes de Bandag de Shawinigan [1986] R.J.Q. 956. 1986 C.A. 200-09-000176-856
Que. C.A. In this case Dub6 J.A. said:
Je crois que nous avons ici un exemple concret de ce qu'est une erreur draisonnable:
l'intim,, Paul-Emile Jobin, aprbs s'tre fait dire clairement qu'il 6tait mis A la porte, pr6sente
un grief contestant son congeiement et sur une simple question de procddure, de jeu de
mots, se trouve accul6 i un cul-de-sac et se voit plac dans rimpossibilit6 de faire valoir les
droits qu'il pretend avoir A rencontre de son congediement; parce qu'on lui dit erron~ment
qu'il s'est tromps de mot en ridigeant son grief il se retrouve sans emploi et incapable de
faire valoir ses droits.
175. Blanchard, supra, note 10.
176. See Eliott, No Evidence" A Ground of Judicial Review in Canadian Administrative Law
(1972), 37 Sask. Law Rev. 48. See also supra, note 72.
177. Wade, supra, note 172 at 287.
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These principles were applied recently by Halperin, J. in Kuziomko v.
Commission des Affaires Sociales.178 That case is a neat illustration of the
type of situation where an error of fact 179 is so glaring and so unfair in
result as to be beyond the policy of tolerance by the courts. 180 It has been
said that such an error of fact amounts to a pure error of law.18' This
formulation would leave "mere" errors of fact outside review unless they
are clearly jurisdictional. Such verbal gymnastics neither add nor subtract
anything to the state of the law.
When we assimilate at least partially unreasonableness and "no
evidence" and consider Wade's words,182 we see that our law does not
differ much from the U.S. "substantive evidence" rule. In Evans et al.
Administrative Law Cases, Texts and Materials83 the rule is described. 18 4
The writers then go on to say:
There are several reasons why the application of this provision should be
treated with reserve as a compelling analogy for the development of a
general principle in our law.
They then proceed to list arguments in favour of a lesser degree of
judicial review in Canada then in the U.S.A. There is little doubt that
American examples must be treated with caution since Canadian Courts
often refuse to follow them. However, in this case, the general principle
is already established and it is not less generous with respect to review in
Canada than in the United States. 85 The restrictive view advocated by
Evans does not seem compelling.
In addition to decisions reached without evidence or without a
sufficient amount of evidence, decisions based on capricious or arbitrary
findings of fact will be quashed. In Villaroel v. ME, 86 in note 6, Pratte,
J. pointed out that a totally unjustified refusal to believe an affidavit
would be grounds for judicial review. Review of these types of error
seems to attract less attention or controversy than "no evidence". Such
review is solidly anchored in our law.
It is a natural corollary of "no evidence", that decisions based on illegal
178. Kuziomko v. Commission desAffaires Sociales, supra, note 72.
179. In that case, the interpretation of medical reports.
180. See also the case of Surujpal v. MEI and Rajudeen v. MEI supra, note 76 where a
decision of the Immigration Appeal Board was overturned as unreasonable on the facts.
181. See the oft-cited case R. v. Nat Bell Liquors, [1922] 2 A.C. 128 (P.C.). See supra, note
72.
182. Wade, supra, note 172.
183. Evans, Janisch, Mullan, Risk, Administrative Law Cases, Texts and Materials, (Toronto:
Edmonton-Montgomery Limited, 1980).
184. Id at 499-500.
185. It follows that Nat Bell Liquors, supra, note 185, represents too restrictive a view and is
no longer safe authority to rely on.
186. Villaroelv. ME, supra, note 75.
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evidence' 87 or improper and irrelevant considerations 88 be quashed. This
is so not only when there is no other evidence, but even where there is
other evidence but the illegality could conceivably have hurt one of the
parties. It is not necessary to show that it did have an effect' 8 9 It follows
that decisions can be classified as "unreasonable" not only when the
result is per se unreasonable, but when the stake or absence of evidence
makes that result unreasonable. On other evidence, the same decisions
could be reached and may well be reached if a new hearing is ordered.
It was unreasonable only because of the manner in which it was reached.
VI. Unreasonableness and error of law on the face of the record
One question that may be legitimately asked, in view of the development
and definition of unreasonableness, especially with respect to matters of
law, is whether the now venerable concept of "error of law on the face
of the record" still has any real purpose. This concept has long been used
to describe error of law within jurisdiction which would be subject to
review if there was no privative clause, but would yield to a privative
clause. 90 The argument against this concept having any future may be
phrased as follows. If an error of law is plain so that no dispute is possible
about it then it is unreasonable and therefore ultra vires; if it is on the
other hand doubtful and controversial, then the administrative decision-
maker's view of his jurisdiction will normally prevail and there will be no
error at all.
This logical operation is tempting but, it is submitted, incorrect. There
are still two circumstances where error of law on the face of the record
(i.e. error of law within jurisdiction) may occur.
The first circumstance is where the purpose of the tribunal is precisely
to decide questions of law and it errs, but not in such a gross manner as
to lose jurisdiction. The principle example are lower courts (e.g.
provincial courts) and the leading case is A. G. Que. v. Labrecque.'91 In
187. E.g. unfairly obtained evidence. See Re Dalinga and City of Calgary (1975), 62 D.L.R.
(3d) 433 (Alta. C.A.). Clearly, Charter protections will apply to administrative tribunals. This
principle will not however introduce all of the strict rules of evidence into administrative and
quasi-judicial proceedings. It will still be possible to continue to receive evidence which would
be inadmissible in an ordinary trial so long as it is not illegal, oppressive or unfair to do so.
188. See Grey, supra, note I 1 at 114-119. See also Oakwood v. Municipality of St Frangois
Xavier, supra, note 82; Shavernoch v. FCC No. 1 (1982), 136 D.L.R. (3d) 447 (SCC) as
examples of this decided since the Osgoode Hall article.
189. This is the same situation as where there is a breach of the rule to act fairly. See Mehr,
supra, note 137; Kane, supra, note 45. On this point, as on so many others, the federal court
has at times shown a tendency to be more favourable to decision-makers: Re Rohm and Hans
Canada Lt supra, note 140. This case is clearly wrong.
190. R. v. Northumberland ex. p. Shaw, supra, note 1. See Jones & de Villars, supra, note I
at 273 for an analysis. See also A.G. Que. v. Farrah et aL, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 638 per Pratte, J.
191. A.G. Que. v. Labrecque, supra, note 19.
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that case, the Small Claims Court made a plain error of law, but because
a court's business is to decide law and because there was a privative
clause, no review was possible.192
The second situation where error of law on the face of the record may
exist is where an error is not totally unjustifiable but, despite the tendency
to adopt the decision-maker's views in such cases, the court concludes
that the opposite view is correct. There is no conceptual bar against a
court choosing a different view than the lower body even where both are
arguable. In other words, the judicial restraint is only a principle and not
a rule and even where an arguably correct decision is challenged before
the courts, it may be found to be wrong. This has been directly stated by
the Supreme Court in jurisdictional matters.193 It applies also to non
jurisdictional ones.
In such cases, if there is a privative clause, there will be no review but
if there is not, review will be possible. 194 One can ask oneself, for
instance, what would have happened in CUPE195 in the absence of the
privative clause. The likely answer is that, in such a case, the Court would
have had to go further than it did in deciding the point of law. With the
privative clause, the sole question was whether the decision was
unreasonable and therefore ultra vires. Without it, the Court would have
had to decide whether it was right, even if reasonable, and then the
Labour Relations Board's opinion would only have been one among
many factors considered by the Court.
It follows that, at least conceptually, error of law on the face of the
record still has a place. In reality it may not be very significant, since a
court will almost always classify as ultra vires and unreasonable a section
of law which it finds intolerable and not pronounce itself on one it finds
"reasonable". Only in very special cases will it declare a decision wrong
but within jurisdiction.
VII. Are reasonableness andfairness completely separate and distinct
It would be neat and esthetically pleasing to say that the concepts of
reasonableness and fairness 196 are separate and distinct and that one can
always classify any difficulty as pertaining to one or the other. It would
also be perilously facile.
192. Labrecque, supra, note 19, would probably have been decided differently if the decision
emanated from an arbitrator or other quasi-judicial body, rather than a court. It would
certainly have been decided differently in the absence of a privative clause.
193. Syndical desEmployds deproduction and C.LR.R, supra, note 25.
194. However, under 28 of the Federal CourtAct any error of law is subject to review.
195. CUPE, supra, note 64.
196. Jurisdiction, as we have seen, is a word frequently used in connection with both of the
others. It, therefore, could not be separated from them.
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In fact, it stands to reason that all decisions to exclude evidence which
amount to unfairness are also unreasonable. Thus, the cases of
Roberval' 97 and Tribunal98 can conveniently be classified as both.
It would be possible to turn this into a tautology by postulating that it
is unreasonable to be unfair. This would not, however, be of any
assistance in understanding and explaining the law. On the other hand, it
is of interest to note that any decision which violates the duty to act fairly
but does not amount to a total refusal of hearing usually entails an
unreasonable decision on what is admissible or relevant 99 or on the
conditions to be imposed on the exercise of the duty to act fairly.200
We thus see that any categories that one might set up are only tentative
and that, at all times, the different concepts must be considered together.
VIII. The special treatment of labour relations
One fact is striking. Almost all of the recent cases which seemingly
restrict judicial review 201 are in the field of labour relations.202 Almost all
of the cases which seemingly extend judicial review are not in that
field.203 This is too regular to be written off as a coincidence. It is all the
more significant when one remembers that, in the past, labour relations
was a field very frequently selected for judicial intervention, almost
always on the side of management.204 It is not surprising that higher
197. Roberval. supra, note 56.
198. Tribunal, supra, note 56.
199. Roberval, supra, note 56.
200. E.g. Where an adjoumement is unreasonably refused McCarthy v. ME, [1979] 1 EC.
121 (Fed. C.A.) or where information is unfairly withheld (Radulesco, supra, note 53) or
obtained (Kane, supra, note 45).
201. But, it is argued here, these cases do not have that effect.
202. CUPE, supra, note 64; Teamsters' Union Local 938 v. Massicotte (1982), 134 D.L.R. 3d
385 (SCC) [1982] 1 S.C.R. 710; Syndicat desEmployis, supra, note 25; Blanchard supra, note
10; CLRB v. Nauss and Halifax Longshoremen, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 245, Re Alberta Union of
Public Employees (1982), 136 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
Labour relations are to be understood here in a broad sense. For instance, arbitration in the
medical field, a common occurrence even without formal accreditation must be included: St.
LucHospital v. Lafrance (1982), 136 D.L.R. (3d) 577 (S.C.C.). What is important is that these
arbitration decisions usually concern economic regulation and not issues of basic rights.
However, as soon as the basic rights are affected, the courts must look into the matter at some
depth and consider the policy question: Galea v. Centre Hospitalier Rouyn-Noranda, [1984]
C.A. 37 (Que. C.A.); Evoy v. Ouellette 1986 SC 500-05-004930-853 (Que. SC per Martin J.).
This last case is also significant in that it makes a sharp distinction between decisions "merely"
unreasonable and those "patently" so.
203. E.g. Nicholson, supra, note 4; Martineau No. 2, supra, note 4, Cardinal, supra, note 141.
204. See Grey, supra, note 39. In Canada, promanagement invervention in labour relations
was common until fairly recently. It was the British Privy Council which, in John East Iron
Works v. Labour Relations Board (1948), 48 D.L.R. 673, prevented s. 96 from being used to
sterilize the movement towards relatively equal power in collective bargaining. This type of
jurisprudence inspired Professor Laskin's (as he then was) criticism in Certiorari to Labour
Boards: The Apparent Futility of Privative Clauses (1952), 30 Can. Ban Rev. 968.
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courts, seeking to maintain a fair balance between the claims of capital
and labour, at least before the Courts, have discouraged intervention
except in very flagrant cases. The problems which arose - the special
nature of labour relations, the conservatism of many lawyers and judges
(but not usually of the leaders of the profession0 5) and the need to abstain
from much review if the system was to work - were not common to
other fields of public law.
The exceptional situation in labour relations was emphasized by
Laskin, C. J. in one of his last judgments, CLRB v. Halifax
Longshoremen Association.2 6 He said:207
There is no doubt that, as already noted, we tread a narrow line and
nothing said in this case can be taken to establish any general principle.
There may be an area in law relating to superior court review of other
tribunals, judicial as well as administrative where more fundamental issues
arise than arise in the circumstances of these proceedings. No doubt there
will be required on occasion some infringement of the proper limits ofjurisdictional review where an administrative tribunal, responding to
questions of fact, must construe and apply its constitutive authority, be it
contractual or statutory. Nothing herein determined should be read as
bearing on such considerations faced as we are here with a unique and
narrow question arising out of the extraordinary framework of these
labour relations.
Where more "fundamental" issues arose, such as liberty, basic issues of
justice and integrity of the public administration system, our courts have
not shown the reluctance to intervene which at times appeared in many
labour arbitration cases.208 It follows that, if a new policy of judicial
restraint can be observed at all, it is one of very limited application and
without effect except, to some extent, in one field.209
IX. Conclusion
There is no doubt that Canadian administrative law has changed beyond
recognition in the last fifteen years. Opponents of judicial review have
attempted to see in some recent trends a move towards renewed emphasis
on judicial restraint. It is submitted that this conclusion is not correct.
205. That is, not usually of the highest courts; nor consistently of any court.
206. Canadian Labour Relations Board v. Halifax Longshoremen's Association, supra, note
201.
207. Id at259.
208. See Nicholson, supra, note 4; Martineau No. 2, supra, note 4; Radulesco, supra, note 116;
Singh, supra, note 51; Howard v. Presiding Officer of Inmate Disciplinary Court of Stony
Mountain Institution, supra, note 110; Crevier v. A. G. Que., supra, note 22, for examples of
this. See also Grey supra, note 39.
209. And even in that field restraint is not universal. See Miriam Homes, supra, note 67 and
especially Alliance des Infirmiares de Sherbrooke v. Hopital d'Youville (1985), CA 500-09-
001561-844 (Que. C.A.). Many of the cases cited in this essay are labour cases.
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Judicial restraint has always existed, firstly because judicial review is
not appeal and mere disagreement with a decision has never constituted
legal grounds to quash it and secondly, because where a specialized
tribunal is given policy powers, it would clearly be undesirable for a
legalistic analysis of rights and obligations to be made by courts at evety
opportunity. None of this is new in any way.210
Where opponents of judicial review may draw some comfort is
Dickson, J.'s dictum in CUPE21 that "courts... should not be alert to
brand as jurisdictional... that which may doubtfully be So. 2 12 However,
this can be seen as a rationalization rather than as a restriction.
One trend which cannot be doubted is the one away from
technicalities, procedural niceties and an accent on remedies to a basic
acceptance of the need to decide every debate on the merits. What
CUPE213 teaches us is to cease searching for a technical formula for
judicial review, for some litmus paper test for "jurisdictional issues" and
to consider in each case, the nature of the tribunal, its expertise, and the
connection between its expertise and the impugned decision. Sometimes,
a decision, even in the area of expertise, will be too blatantly ultra vires
to be saved. In other cases, however, the expertise will play a major role
in deciding which among doubtful decisions is to stand and which is to
be quashed. The law will not be more or less favourable towards judicial
review, but it will grant review with greater concern for basic justice and
less for arid rules.
If the CUPE214 case has had neutral total effect on judicial review, in
other developments, review has made great strides. Fairness has been
relatively firmly established. Reasonableness has been formally added to
the list of jurisdictional grounds of review 215 and it is the counterpart of
fairness, doing to the substantive aspect of decisions what fairness did for
procedure. It must be stressed that unreasonableness took nothing away
- decisions which are clearly ultra vires or which are made in a manner
inconsistent with the principles of fairness, are still quashed, even if they
are reasonable.
"Unreasonableness" is an additional argument, drawing its strength
from the fact that courts are not disposed to tolerate arbitrary government
or administration, whatever technical arguments are mustered in its
defence.
210. See Local Government Board v. Arlidge, [1915] A.C. 120, a surprisingly modem-
sounding discussion.
211. CUPE, supra, note 64.
212. But the full force of this statement is probably limited to labour relations. See supra, note
205, 206, 207. The statement was first cited, supra, note 95.
213. CUPE, supra, note 64.
214. CUPE, supra, note 64.
215. It had long been present, but without clear formulation.
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The result is a form of judicial review adapted to a society in which the
state intervenes constantly in the economic and social life of its citizens.
When state participation was relatively rare, one could live with
numerous technical, procedural and substantive protections for public
authority.2 6 Now, such protection would mean denial of the rule of law
in very important areas of human endeavour. The government or other
public authorities decide how we are to conduct many aspects of our
lives, spend public funds and do a myriad of other things not imagined
fifty years ago. These things affect us in direct and important ways. When
issues not involving administrative law have as great an effect on
everyday life - criminal punishment, family law, contracts, delicts and
so on - there is normally access to the courts. That is one of the essential
traits of modern liberal democracy.
It would be undesirable and unfair, to make access impossible, or so
risky as to be impractical, in our public law. It would mean two types of
justice - one for the private sector, and one, less effective, for the public
one.
Moreover, it is naive to think that fundamental freedoms and basic
rights are not threatened by public authority, even in a democracy. Power
is always dangerous in all hands, because it is so tempting for those who
wield it to abuse it, often for the best motives. If any protection of basic
freedom and justice is to be serious and if we are not willing to give up
the social benefits of state intervention in our lives then judicial review
becomes one of the most significant tools for controlling public authority
while deriving the desired benefits from its activities. It is important for
it not to be used to paralyze social schemes or to prevent progress where
there is no violation of basic rights and no true injustice. That is where
Dickson, J.'s advice not to brand decisions as jurisdictional too easily is
important.217 However, where there is violation of individual rights,
freedoms or dignity or where there is true injustice, courts must jealously
guard their power to intervene. If it should ever fall into disuetude, the
rule of law would be seriously impaired.
One thing which clearly strengthens the rule of law in public affairs is
the simplification of the legal rules surrounding judicial review. By
reducing such administrative law to relatively simple concepts -
jurisdiction, fairness and reasonableness - the Courts have made it
possible for the basic rules of administrative law to become better-known
both in the legal community and among laymen. By making the result of
216. Save, of course, in criminal law.
217. See also his comments in Reference re Validity of the Residential Tenancies Act, [1981]
S.C.R. 714.
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litigation dependent on the content and not the form of the impugned
decision or the application for review, they have served to increase
confidence that basic rights can successfully be defended from
encroachment.

